Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency

Sreetama Chakraborty
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
Belda College, West Midnapore, West Bengal, India
Email: sreetamaphil@gmail.com

Abstract: This paper reflects a possibility of going beyond the postmodernists’ way of ethically examining non-human animals based on the tripartite pillars of neutrality, universality, and consistency. My concentration focuses on some interrelated queries, such as – What does animal ethics conventionally mean? How did power, hierarchy, and domination separate humans from other animals? How does the fate of non-human animals (whether they ought to be morally considered or not) depend on humans’ moral values? How far is it justified to secure animal rights in the age of perilous animal use, especially for food or during animal experimentation? While examining these issues, I bring into light the several arguments and positions put forward by thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Carl Cohen, Brian Berry, and others. Moreover, my search is for a non-anthropocentric sustainable paradigm, to balance human interests and animal needs together, in order to sustain the future generations of human and non-human intimacy.

Key Words: Animal Ethics, Sentience, Universality, Moral Values, Animal Experimentation, Sustainable ethics.

Introduction: The aim of this paper is to, first, analyze the postmodernists’ approach to animal ethics that is a departure from the traditional way of doing animal ethics adopted especially by the analytic thinkers, and, second, to interpret it in the light of socio-cultural construction. Conventionally, the ethical considerability of non-human animals is judged in the context of standard moral ethical theories such as virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontology. In addition, the tripartite pillars of neutrality, universality, and consistency were held as tools for ethical examination of non-human animals. I will explain how these principles work and how the postmodern approach departs from this trend. Neutrality signifies our suspension of biasedness towards anthropocentrism. The principle of universality demands that morality remains the same for all in all events and in all contexts, even when it extends to the case of non-humans. Moreover, consistency demands that both humans as well as non-humans are of equal importance and ought to be given due and consistent weight. These principles have been put to challenge by animal ethicists belonging to the postmodernist era. The postmodernists argue that advocating neutrality and universality is a sheer impossibility, especially because all humans are embedded in a web of epistemic situations and socio-linguistic backgrounds, and cannot be
situated apart from it. All praxis of morality and values are also byproducts of social construction, and are in no way given or constructed universally. Unlike the earlier trend of animal ethicists, I adopt the postmodernists’ way of looking from an opposite direction, emphasizing emotion, care, responsibility, sympathy, understanding, and so on. It would be more appealing if humans’ emotions and sensitivity towards animals are aroused by making them think as to how non-humans might also consider humans if humans were in that same plane. The whole endeavor of humans is to understand the non-humans in a morally sensitive way and develop a sense in order to accept them, considering their dignity and their right to occupy a place in this beautiful natural world.

Revisiting the Tripartite Pillars: With the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new era revitalizing the very contemporary concerns over environmentalism and animal ethics has taken a unique shape. Across the world, we place non-human animals in a category different from humans, but an interesting trace could be found in Darwin’s project when he reflected on the presence of ‘reason’ at least to some degrees even in non-humans. However, since then the development of animal ethics has been divided into three major stages. The first stage is the 1970s and 80s, when all animal questions were judged based on two major normative ethical principles – consequentialism and deontology. The second stage is the 1990s, when the postmodern approach of commenting on the traditional approach towards animal ethics began, and the third stage emerges with the end of the 20th century, when a new way of looking at animal ethics arose, especially from the perspectives of behavioral psychology and experimental philosophy.

However, with the growing popularity of this discipline, animal ethics worked under the umbrella of three principles – neutrality, universality, and consistency. These principles were also considered determining criterions for being an animal ethicist. A human individual who wants to extend his or her moral consideration towards non-human animals must be neutral, universal, and consistent in their thinking and behavior. Let me begin by giving a brief analysis of how these principles work. Neutrality is the preliminary condition, which demands suspending or withdrawing all anthropocentric attitudes that favor human beings over and above anything else. Neutrality is an unbiased principle of fairness, advocating justice for all species. Under such a condition, all species must receive equal rights and consideration. Human wants and needs ought not to be seen specially or given any particular attention. However, as against this principle, there exists one of the strongest groups advocating anthropocentrism – speciesism, a view analogous to racism and sexism. Unlike animal rights supporters, the advocates of speciesism endorse discrimination against non-human animals. The supporters of speciesism treat one species, humans, as superior to all others. Many consider speciesism a moral illusion. However, this kind of a prejudicial differentiation that speciesism advocates directs us towards a rigid anthropocentric structure, which is by large dangerous for society. A speciesist might argue that one of the major reasons that justify human privilege is sentience. However, that might also
lead to another inquiry: how can we be sure that non-humans have no sentience? There are undoubtedly several scientific procedures by which it becomes possible to conduct tests and experiments in order to find out how the receptor organs of non-human animals respond, whether they are sentient or not. Sufficient proof exists to show that there are vertebrates whose nervous system shows similar receptor functions like that of mentally retarded persons or children, or even more. Would it then be justified to equate an infant with a non-human animal? However, even that would cause trouble for both sides, as on the one hand conducting experiments would harm animals and cause an issue for animal and environmental rights activists, and on the other hand harming an infant would go against ‘human rights’ policies. Therefore, critics attack the speciesists for being biased in the case of children and mentally retarded persons. Humans are incapable of choosing their life as human or to have parents or ancestors of any kind. The same theory applies to all other species of the world.

The second principle of animal ethics is universality. The principle holds that morality remains the same for all people (and even for all species) at all times. This principle is tied to the principle of neutrality. Neutrality insists on unbiasedness whereas universality demands that this unbiasedness is applied universally to all species at all times. In the context of this universalization principle, Tom Regan, in *The Case For Animal Rights*, very well applied the principle of Kantian deontology to explain his position in favor of animal rights. Regan took the basic formula of Kantian moral philosophy. Unlike the utilitarians, Regan holds that all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, regardless of their utility. Having inherent value implies that one has certain fundamental moral rights. In addition, individuals with inherent value must be treated with equal respect. This universal principle, which also serves as the basis for human rights, provides inherent worth to individuals, regardless of class, caste, race, sex, and gender. However, Regan’s uniqueness lies in considering one more element to the above list, viz. species. Species distinction must also not be an issue while considering the universalisability principle. Regan, along with Peter Singer, makes the claim that some animals do deserve the same value as human individuals. Regan argues that, if the universalisability principle would go according to what Kant says, then Kant made it very clear that rationality is the criterion for moral worth, and since children, mentally disabled persons lack this quality, then people of this marginal class are disqualified from being the holders of moral worth. Therefore, they can also be treated in the same way as non-human animals are (the same point was raised against the speciesist). Regan further proposes one more condition to be considered for being worthy of respect and this is the capacity to experience. Whoever possess this capacity ought to be considered morally. In this connection, Regan distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients. “A moral patient,” Regan says, “lacks the ability to formulate… [They] cannot do what is right, nor can they do what is wrong… only moral agents can do what is wrong.” So, for Regan, since humans give importance to those humans who are not moral agents (i.e., moral patients such as infants and mentally retarded persons), therefore animals also ought to get due consideration by parity of reasoning. However, Carl Cohen challenges Regan’s arguments
claiming that we cannot deprive human infants of their rights, just because they are moral patients (in Regan’s words). Cohen’s point becomes clearer when he says,

It is not individual persons who qualify (or are disqualified) for the possession of rights because of the presence or absence in them of some special capacity, thus resulting in the award of rights to some but not to others. Rights are universally human; they arise in a human moral world, in a moral sphere. In the human moral world moral judgements are pervasive; it is the fact that all humans including infants and the senile are members of that moral community – not the fact that as individuals they have or do not have certain special capacities, or merits – that makes humans bearers of rights. Therefore, it is beside the point to insist that animals have remarkable capacities, that they really have a consciousness of self; or of the future, or make plans, and so on [...]. They [supporters of Regan] mistakenly suppose that rights are tied to some identifiable individual abilities or sensibilities, and they fail to see that rights arise only in a community of moral beings, and that therefore there are spheres in which rights do apply and spheres in which they do not.³

Cohen definitely admits humans must restrain from showing ‘brutal’ pain to animals because humans are moral beings and must not act inhumanely, yet that does not imply that any and every human activity must not touch animals in any way.

The third principle, known as the most technical principle of animal ethics, is consistency. Consistency holds that under similar conditions, like interests of all species must be given equal consideration. One of the best references of consistency is portrayed by nature that exists for all entities of the universe in a uniform way, and most importantly, nature treats all entities consistently. Nature has systematically arranged the whole of living systems under a web of cyclical relationships, where each species struggles to survive by feeding on the other species and so on. By this process, two things are maintained – first, the relation among different species remains natural, and that species which find it difficult to survive in the whole cycle of natural predation will automatically disappear. This approach sounds extremely interesting, but is subject to severe criticisms. Given this theory, in any practical situation, there will arise no scientific/natural problem in this consistency theory. The natural law of cycles has been so systematically arranged that each species can exist by being food for the other. This is definitely acceptable, but when we consider the rampant multiple uses in science and technology of experimenting animals and the destruction of natural habitat for human purposes, then the number of animals living in proper conditions comes down. In one way vegetation is dying out, in the other species are getting extinct. Therefore, an ethics for the humans developed. Because natural entities, say trees, animals, and wilderness, do not actually create the problem, as they are adaptable to natural changes. The problem arises for men, because men with their extreme use/misuse of power and intellect have continuously tried to dominate nature. Therefore, men
have to pay the cost for it. The centre of ethics is humans, not animals. Ethical considerations
begin from humans. Therefore, humans must extend their moral/ethical considerability towards
non-humans. If we take the instance of eating, then we must say that humans have a choice,
whereas animals do not. Humans can choose to eat fruits and other plants, but it would be
extremely difficult for a carnivorous animal to think alike, as its biological system would not let
him or her behave that way. The consistency principle actually reflects the view of the modern
utilitarian animal activist, Peter Singer. His view, more widely known as preference
utilitarianism, focuses on how the best interests of the greatest number of all conscious beings
are to be measured, rather than measuring greater happiness. Singer actually focuses on
minimizing pain, rather than maximizing pleasure. For Singer, what counts in animals is their
pain and how much they suffer, and not whether they can reason intelligibly or not. This view
mostly corresponds to what Bentham argued when he said, “the question [about animals] is not,
Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” In Animal Liberation, Singer argues
against prejudiced speciesism and discrimination of animals and calls for equal consideration of
animals on the ground that they have the ability to suffer. He adds another element of
impartiality to all species, but that must be maintained on utilitarian grounds. While applying
impartial treatment to all beings (considering equally the interests of all species), the one whose
utility weighs more is to be given preferential treatment. Under this preferential treatment
equation, as Singer says, “when the interests of two ‘persons’ are in conflict, the interest of the
being estimated to have the greater value receives priority.”

Singer writes:

To avoid speciesism we must allow that beings who are similar in all relevant respects
have a similar right to life—and mere membership in our own biological species cannot
be a morally relevant criterion for this right [...]. We may legitimately hold that there are
some features of certain beings that make their lives more valuable than those of other
beings; but there will surely be some nonhuman animals, whose lives, by any standards,
are more valuable than the lives of some humans. A chimpanzee, dog, or pig, for
instance, will have a higher degree of self-awareness and a greater capacity for
meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or someone in a state of
[advanced] senility. So, if we base the right to life on these characteristics we must grant
these animals a right to life as good as, or better than, such retarded or senile human
beings.

Against this principle of Singer, Judge Richard A. Posner provides a famous counterexample.
Suppose a dog threatens an infant in a busy street, and the only way to prevent the dog from
biting would be to attack the dog, which might also cause the dog to suffer. Singer would say
that it is not justified to cause pain and suffering, even though it is a dog. But any sensible being
would never ever stand to watch the dog bite the innocent infant. One would counter-attack the
animal. This illustration brings out the notion that Singer’s hierarchical cognitive capacities-
based approach is really problematic in many senses, especially in moments of severe crisis, as it
further leads to a problematic dilemma in the expression, “[s]ince neither a newborn human infant nor a fish is a person, the wrongness of killing such beings is not as great as the wrongness of killing a person.” This argument stands as a very good support in Singer’s argument favoring infanticide and euthanasia.

The core principle in support of animal ethics is to go deep into understanding the value of all beings beyond humans. It is to be remembered that humans are not in any way at the centre of the whole living system, rather humans are only one of the species among thousands of living beings in the earth. However, it is only from humans that a sense of moral responsibility develops. This sort of responsibility enables humans to perceive the beautiful presence of not only humans, but of all species and their existence in the universe.

A very interesting point may be noted, where animals’ lack of cognition or reasoning becomes one of the very important and significant reasons for humans to respect them. I recall from literature survey a story where a sheep owner and a hunter have very beautifully expressed what animal feels. They said:

They [animals] have no human feelings and values, they do what is in their instincts. It is very stupid to hate an animal at the individual level [...].

Now I almost have to become a philosopher. They are living beings and you have to respect that. They are not humans. But we do not know for sure what they feel or do not feel. [...]. We have a responsibility since we have received a brain that works differently than theirs.8

By this claim, made by very ordinary persons, it is evident that non-human animals’ lack of cognitive capabilities, which we often consider as inferior, is not to be treated so. Because animals lack cognitive and reasoning capabilities, a human’s responsibility extends more and we ought to widen our toleration towards them, rather than being vulnerable towards them.

**Quest for Values:** However, postmodern thinkers have brought a turn towards the very contemporary stance in the philosophy of animal rights. They claim that, given the social and cultural interlinkages in which an individual is embedded, it is extremely difficult to achieve the principles of neutrality and objectivity in reality. Neutrality, universality, and consistency are definitely add-ups in ethically considering the animals, but cannot be treated as hard and fast rules or criteria for morally considering non-human animals. But why? Many thinkers consider that the principles of absolute neutrality, universality, and consistency are some fixed ideals, which are at large impossible to attain in reality. What the conventional theorists miss while framing this kind of absolute principle is that the bearer of morality is humans, and humans being one of the intelligent species of this creation naturally possess the notions of domination,
supremacy, and audacity towards their own species. Human beings across the world vary in respect of their living, cultures, races, sexes, geography, and so on. Under such varied conditions, it is difficult to lay such a fixed principle that everyone ought to extend their moral consideration towards animals based on neutral, universal, and consistent principles. But in no way must humans lose hope, since as a morally sensible and responsible species, it must always be human’s motto to shed away speciesism, and adopt a green and non-anthropocentric attitude towards life.

Human beings always quest for values, and this conception of value makes humanity distinct from other species. Values are not something located in the Platonic world. If we promote value from a subjective choice, then values are not absolute or fixed ideals, which lay imperatives for humans to follow. Humans are tied to multifarious perspectives – social, economic, cultural, geographical, biological, etc. and resultantly each of us has a distinct gender, ethnic and racial identity. That what is considered ethically good in one culture may be considered bad in the other. For an instance, burping after meals is a sign of politeness in some cultures, while in others it indicates being rude or impolite. But that in no way discards the conception of universal value. My point is that there are certain imperatives that tend towards universality. Suppose in a case where five patients, each with a different organ failing, are in dying bed. And luckily there is found one healthy man, whose various organs can save the life of the five dying men. Should we then promote the life of the five dying men at the cost of the life of one healthy man? Obviously not, since it is always immoral to kill an innocent person for the sake of others or use others merely as a means. Life is precious to everyone, so without the consent of one, we cannot harm one’s life to save others. We ought to apply the same principle towards all sentient beings, and it is how humans’ orient themselves towards life and perspectives that doubtlessly influences how they value life and others, including non-human animals.

However, in the postmodern era, especially with the emergence of the linguistic turn in the philosophical domain, humans’ views towards non-humans have also undergone changes. In addition, all social constructions and human relations are dominated mostly by power and hierarchy, which in turn largely affects humans’ relation to the non-human animals. Social oppression results due to the family in which one is born into, and depends on one’s caste, class, race, sex, species, etc. I firmly agree with the postmodern feminists that along with this male-female hierarchical structure, there also developed another classical dualistic structure, the human-animal set-up that has historically tried to separate the two both emotionally and morally. Brian Berry, in an article entitled “Human and nonhuman animal rights and oppression: An Evolution Towards Equality,” draws a similarity between oppression of human minorities and non-human animals. He writes:

Some humans are more oppressed than others; for example, women, racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, the differently-abled, children, the aged, and prisoners. I describe
stereotypes and unfair treatment as they are similarly applied to disadvantaged humans and nonhuman animals. A primary obstacle in discussing nonhuman animal oppression is the seeming absurdity, according to many humans, of the mere notion of nonhuman animals having equal worth relative to human animals [...] Prejudice against particular species is partly due to irrational messages passed along through socialization [...]. Prejudice can be due to historical and present-day accounts of the dangers posed by [humans and even by the] non-human animals. However, it is seen that many thinkers, such as Peter Singer, Carol J. Adams, and others, have shared similar approaches. The postmodern claim is that animal rights violations (including animal experimentation) have expanded primarily because of animals’ lack of participatory abilities in discourse and in social construction. The fate of non-human animals, whether they ought to be morally considered or not, is largely determined through this process of discourse.

Discourse is a segment of the critical theory of society where practical questions are addressed based on continued rational discussions. The mode of encountering discourses in different societies varies according to the various social constructs of individuals’ lives and their reasoning capabilities. Fairclough defines discourse as “a practice not just of representing the world but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.” It is through discourse that the inferiority meted out to animals can be addressed. Peter Singer sharply points out that the English language reflects the prejudice against non-human animals. Singer writes, “[t]he English language, like other languages, reflects the prejudices of its users.” Singer illustrates this with the word “animal,” which in common day usage excludes human beings. While speaking, we regularly use the phrase “humans and animals” to indicate that humans are something different from non-human animals, but forget that humans are also just a kind of animal. This semantic distinction actually distances humans from non-humans and makes humans irresponsible to animal suffering. Peter Singer writes:

A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons, practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice [...]. [W]e must be prepared to rethink all our attitudes to other groups, including the most fundamental of them. We need to consider our attitudes from the point of view of those who suffer by them, and by the practices that follow from them. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that operates so as consistently to benefit the same group – usually the group to which we ourselves belong – at the expense of another group. So we come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement.

Conventional language has several examples to show how non-human animals as a separate class are completely sidelined, ignored, and treated as inferior. Whereas animals are slaughtered,
humans are murdered. While the former is considered to be completely normal, the latter symbolizes brutal, violent, and uncared killing. That animals also feel pain, being fleshed bodies, is not taken into consideration at all. Therefore, all of our language and discourses reflects traces of (un)intended animal oppression. This kind of socio-cultural construction dictates what morals an individual ought to possess towards animals and what not. Derek Ryan points out that our relations to animals depend largely on how we categorize “humans” and “animals,” and how far we can go beyond this categorization and recognize the “unrecognizable” (the animals) without any intention to capture or control them either by power or domination. Feminists shun the approaches of neutrality, universality, and consistency, and rather embrace the elements of care, sympathy, kindness, etc. In favor of the neglected class of human society, i.e., women, feminists take such a stance. However, the same is extended even to animals. Animals belong to an unspeakable and inexpressible class, and it is our responsibility to hear their cries and feel their pain. Animals are also fleshed bodies; hence, we ought to count their sufferings. Among the postmodernists’ trend, Van Plumwood, Carol Adams, Vandana Shiva, and many others share this feminist approach. Carol Adams sharply brings together animals within the socio-cultural framework. In all human endeavors, animals are objectified, commodified, and treated as an element of human consumption. Resultantly, there have been many voices that spoke in favor of vegetarianism, so that animals’ presence could be felt, shared, and experienced. They have a common approach, to shun away instrumentality. Animals ought not to be considered mere means for attaining something. Rather, they must be considered for their own sake. Therefore, it is possible for humans to be truly responsible and value non-human animals aesthetically and morally.

A web of epistemic relations sets up human society (because humans are aware that they have “reason”) and each individual is tied to each other individual culturally, geographically, and linguistically. Each individual or group does possess variations in their internal social structure, but all humans are essentially linked with one another in this web of chained relationships. In such a kind of structure, it is difficult to uphold and conceive moral values that are absolutely neutral, universal, and consistent. Humans are the possessors of moral values. Hence, all moral values originate from human perspectives and humans consider non-humans from a human perspective only. But human values must not be considered from a human viewpoint only, i.e., moral values of a human must not be anthropocentric in the sense that they must not privilege humans over non-humans. Rather, it becomes humans’ responsibility to hold moral values that also reflect their responsiveness towards non-humans. Moral values are not given abstractly but are rather constructed according to what human code of ethics guarantees and permits. Similarly, it is true that only humans have aesthetic value, but aesthetic value is not only meant for humans. Rather, the sense of beauty, truth, and goodness that humans have must extend to all species and ecosystems. Through an evolutionary historical process, it has been possible for humans to go beyond the essential features such as animality and rationality and discover the traits of aesthetic beauty and responsibility as unique to them. I agree with the postmodernists when they hold that
humans are already embedded in such a socio-linguistic framework, and that their moral concerns towards other species must be inculcated in a more technical way, which is familiar to the humans, i.e., through bonding. Animals ought to be considered as part of human society. Humans’ moral considerations and responsibility must extend in similar ways as they extend their considerations towards their fellow human beings, through care, sympathy, justice, kindness, and attention.

**Way Out:** This paper doubtlessly reflects an appeal to humanity for governing all of their interactions with non-human animals based on love, sympathy, care, kindness, and so on, but parallel to this, an important question that crops up in my mind is how animal rights ought to be seen from the broader context of human rights. How far is it justified to secure animal rights in the age of perilous animal use, especially for food or during animal experimentation? This issue might seem to be a contemporary concern, yet can be traced back to the ideas of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, one of the earliest reflections of whom admires natural slavery. It becomes clearer from Aristotle’s writing in this passage:

> Similarly we must clearly think that after their birth, plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the benefit of men, the tame ones for service and for food, and the wild ones, if not all at least most, for the sake of food and other needs, so that clothes and tools may be made from them. If then nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it must have made all of them for the sake of men.\(^{15}\)

To speak in simple words, humans’ interaction with non-human animals takes place particularly at meal times and in research. These are the oldest forms of animal use. In some cases, the practical applicability of animal use in the case of taking food is justified, especially in cases where survival of a human being overrides the loss of a chicken or goat. For instance, we can take the example of the Inuit (or those living in extreme cold climatic conditions) who had to take animal flesh for keeping their bodies warm. But considering this case, we cannot justify the rampant killing of animals for flesh. Or, in this connection, we can recall how Benjamin Franklin defends his eating of flesh in his *Autobiography* when he writes, “if you [animals] eat each other, I don’t see why we [humans] may not eat you [animals]?\(^{16}\)” Consuming animal flesh on this ground is justified primarily on the grounds of luxury and it reflects humans’ beastly behavior. I agree with Peter Singer in saying that it is absolutely unjustified to justify human consumption of animal flesh by considering animals’ dietary habits. It is because animals are not yet capable of moral reflection that humans possess.

In another way, humans justify animal killing for the purpose of experimentation. Being one of the intelligent species of this universe, the urge to know more has led humans to discover the undiscovered. Humans continue to invent thousands of products ranging from drugs to cosmetics, leaving a grievous impact upon non-human animals. Animals are regularly objectified...
in labs due to heavy experimentations done upon them. On one hand, it becomes extremely difficult to see the sufferings inflicted upon our neighbor species, animals, while on the other hand, would we (as an opponent of experimentation) be really prepared to let thousands (of human beings) die from a dreadful disease that could be cured if experimented on only a few animals? This is really a moral dilemma, and it calls for writing another paper.

Nevertheless, today, when the whole world is engaged in upholding the notion of sustainable development, let us be hopeful enough and be prepared to balance human life in ways that do not cause inhumane harm to non-human animals. For a sustainable life, the minimal human interests must be balanced in accordance with the interests and welfare of the animals involved. For the sake of sustainable development, let us meet hands to promote a non-anthropocentric approach in our lives through endorsing animal welfare, a holistic approach, which integrates ethical and environmental considerations of animals. I wind up recalling a poem by Kenneth Cassar that reflects animals’ cries for a helping human hand:

Out there is a cry of anguish and of pain  
Out there someone’s suffering for someone else’s blame  
Out there, there is someone who’s lost all sense of hope  
Waiting for some kind of help without which he can’t cope.

Out there lies a semblance of a once healthy being  
Who’ll die a slow and painful death unless he gets some seeing  
But out there stands a person who cares for animals, true  
Yes someone who can make a change, that person could be you17

Author Contribution: Author developed the conceptual idea and wrote the manuscript.

Conflict of Interest: Declared none.

Acknowledgement: I dedicate this work and express my deepest compassion to the suffering of the non-human animals, who are a bigger part of our life.

References:

3 Ibid. 97.
9 It reminds us of a famous Kantian imperative, which says not to treat anyone as an means, but always as an end.
11 Ibid. 156.
14 Ibid. v.